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State  Jurisdiction over 
Ice  Island T-3: 
The Escamilla  Case 
DONAT PHARANDl 
The matter of State jurisdiction  over  ice  islands  in the Arctic Ocean  is no longer 
only an academic question raised by professors of international law. A recent 
incident  involving the killing of a  member of an American research team on Ice 
Island T-3 raises that question  in  a  very  realistic  way. The  purpose of this short 
paper it to review the relevant facts and to offer a few comments on the issue 
of jurisdiction in the light of the legal nature of the Arctic Ocean and of Ice 
Island T-3. 
THE FACTS 
On 16 July 1970, the shooting of the leader of a 20-man joint government- 
industry  research  team, one Bennie Lightsy of Louisville,  Kentucky, took place 
in  a hut on Ice Island T-3 (the third ice  island  sighted as a radar target, hence its 
name T-3),  floating in the Arctic Ocean at 84" 47' North latitude and 106" 28' 
West longitude, within the so-called Canadian sector. Lightsy had gone to the 
hut to attempt to settle  an  argument  over  a  jug of wine  when he was shot with 
a  rifle  by one  Mario Escamilla,  a  Mexican-born  American  citizen from California. 
Following a radio report about the incident, an American investigation team, 
composed of Naval and  Coast  Guard Intelligence  officers and an Assistant  U.S. 
Attorney, flew to Thule, an American Air Force Base in Greenland, and then 
to the ice island in question. Upon completion of the investigation, Escamilla 
was  brought to the United  States, after a  change of plane at Thule, and  landed at 
Dulles airport in Virginia. He was initially charged with murder in the first  degree 
before a magistrate in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 
within  which  Dulles airport is located, and  was  subsequently  indicted by a grand 
jury for the  lesser  offence of second  degree murder. 
THE  ISSUE OF JURISDICTION 
I 
i 
The issue  raised  is  whether the United States or  Canada, or both, had jurisdic- 
tion over the alleged crime committed on Ice Island T-3. The complaint stated 
that the ice  island  was  floating on the high seas within the special maritime and 
I territorial jurisdiction of the United States of America and  out of the jurisdiction 
of a particular State. The only other State which could have  claimed  jurisdiction, 
since  the  incident took place well  within its arctic sector,  was Canada.  The latter, 
1Civil  Law  Section,  Faculty of Law,  University of Ottawa. 
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however,  chose to refrain from interfering in  any way in the matter. A spokesman 
from the Department of External Affairs is reported to have stated that they 
wanted to avoid putting Canada in a position of seeming to interfere with the 
course of justice for the sake of clarifying  a  very  complicated point of international 
law. The fact that Canada did not choose to exercise  jurisdiction  over the incident, 
even if it was  convinced that it had  the right to  do so, is quite understandable, 
since both the accused  person and the victim  were  American  nationals, and the 
floating research station was under the exclusive control of American  authorities. 
If Canada, however,  were  serious about claiming  sovereignty  over the “ice pack” 
within its sector, it was important to make it clear to the United States that  it 
had refrained from exercising its jurisdiction without prejudice to its claim. The 
reason is that, if the claim made by Canada is one equivalent to  that of territorial 
sovereignty, the jurisdiction  covers  all  persons and things  within the area claimed 
and, in principle,  is  exclusive of that of any other State. These various  aspects of 
the issue of jurisdiction warrant some  analysis. 
A  COMMENTARY 
Any  significant  discussion of the jurisdictional issue  raised  must  encompass  at 
least three considerations: the various  bases of state jurisdiction, the legal status 
of an ice  island and that of the Arctic Ocean. 
Legal Status of the Arctic Ocean 
The basic question here is whether the Arctic Ocean may be considered in 
international law as  an ordinary ocean to which the principle of the freedom of 
the high  seas  is  applicable. If so, it is open  to all nations and no state may  validly 
purport to subject  any part of it  to its sovereignty. This is a  well-established prin- 
ciple of international customary  law, and it was  embodied in the Convention on 
the High Seas in 1958. The answer to the question depends essentially on the 
possibility of navigation,  since this is the underlying reason for the very  existence 
of the principle itself. The extent of this  possibility  in turn is related to the  presence 
and nature of the ice. Some international lawyers have characterized the arctic 
polar ice as immobile  ice,  glacial territory, permanent ice, polar ice cap, quasi- 
land and quasi-fixed  mass.  They maintain either that the acquisition of territorial 
sovereignty  is  possible  over  ice in somewhat the same way as over land, or that 
some form of national jurisdiction and control should  be  exercised by the coastal 
states. In other words, the pack  ice in the Arctic Ocean should  be  considered as 
land rather than water.  Such  a  view  does not take sufficient account of the fact 
that the Arctic Ocean, with the North Pole resting on 4,300 metres of water,  is 
basically no different than any other ocean. True, there is  an undersea  mountain 
extending from the New Siberian Islands to Ellesmere Island, and the  sea  floor 
reveals  a  physiographic  complex of basins and ridges, but there is  nonetheless  a 
displacement of water  masses as in other oceans,  though perhaps to a  lesser  degree. 
As for the presence of ice, the so-called “ice cap” consists of ice floes or frag- 
ments of ice  averaging about 3 metres  in  thickness; it is far from being compact, 
permanent or immobile. The ice is not compact since the polynyas or “water 
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openings" account for roughly 10 per cent of the area covered by the pack ice 
and, during the summer at least, the Arctic Ocean is predominantly marine in 
character. The ice is not permanent in the sense that it does not melt.  Observa- 
tions  have  shown that melting and freezing take place at  both the top  and  bottom 1 of the ice; in summer, there is  ablation by melting of the upper surface and, in 
winter, there is accretion of the lower surface by freezing. Finally, the ice is 
actually quite mobile,  since the ice  floes are not only  in constant motion  locally 
but move about all over the Arctic Ocean; a  considerable portion is carried out- 
side  completely,  mainly through the Greenland Sea and the numerous  sounds of 
the Canadian Archipelago. 
Having regard to the above  characteristics of the ice,  some  navigation  is  actually 
possible. The Arctic Ocean  has  witnessed three types of navigation: drift surface, 
sub-surface, and conventional surface navigation. Drift surface navigation  is 
accomplished  by drifting in an icebound  vessel or  on  an ice  floe  (or  ice  island such 
as T-3)  and permits various  scientific  investigations such as those  relating to the 
ice, the water and the ocean  floor. The possibility of sub-surface  navigation  across 
the Arctic Ocean  has been  well  established  by the Nautilus and the Skate in 1958, 
the Seadragon in 1960, and a  British submarine in March 1971. The possibility 
of using  sub-surface  navigation to transport oil  across the Arctic Ocean is a real 
one, and  General Dynamics has already made proposals to a  number of oil  com- 
panies to build 170,000-ton nuclear-powered submarine tankers for that purpose. 
In so far as  conventional surface is concerned, it has  been  practised in the periph- 
eral seas of the Arctic Ocean for a  long  time and, with the development of ice- 
breakers, northings of over 80" have  been attained in  various parts of the Arctic 
Ocean itself.  Moreover,  now that we have the valuable data obtained during the 
two  voyages of the Manhattan in the Northwest  Passage, there is nothing to pre- 
vent the development of huge  icebreaking tankers possessing  the  necessary shaft 
horsepower  which the Manhaltan lacked to make its way trhough MClure Strait. 
If a surface ship can navigate through the polar ice of the MClure, there is  an 
excellent  chance that  it  can manage the same  kind of polar  ice  in the Arctic Ocean. 
The foregoing  should indicate that it is not possible to assimilate the pack  ice 
of the Arctic Ocean  to land, that some  navigation  is  already  taking place and that 
the extent of such navigation  is  bound to increase as the need for marine trans- 
portation in that  Ocean develops.  Consequently, the principle of the freedom of 
the high seas ought to apply. 
Legal Status of Ice Island T-3 
T-3 is one of a  number of ice  islands  which  have  been  located  in the Arctic 
Ocean  and which appear  to have  originated from ice  shelves off the north coast 
of Ellesmere Island. The northern part of this  large island resembles Greenland 
and the antarctic continent, in that it is partly covered with glaciers projecting 
ice  lobes deep in the fiords and into the sea, thus forming the landward part of 
the ice  shelves; the seaward projection is  believed to be the result of an accumula- 
tion of snow on sea ice held in position  by the projecting  glaciers for a long period 
of years. Ice shelves  used to front many of the fiords of Ellesmere but most of 
them  have broken  up into large fragments and are now floating  among the ordinary 
I 
I 
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ice floes of the Arctic Ocean. As long as those huge ice-tongues are joined to 
the land and the glaciers which produced them -in other words, as long as 
they remain ice  shelves - they are 'generally considered as land, since their thick- 
ness and immobility make them  as  effective a barrier to navigation as land itself. 
The question arises, however, as to what happens when those ice shelves give 
birth to ice  islands. Due to their size and thickness,  they are capable of occupation 
by research expeditions  with greater facility  and  security than ordinary ice  floes. 
T-3 is the largest and sturdiest ice island to have been occupied in the Arctic 
Ocean. It was originally  described  as measuring 3 1 miles  in circumference, having 
5 miles across in the narrowest part, and being about 200 feet thick. Colonel 
Joseph Fletcher, U.S.A.F., first landed on it in March 1952, and a camp was 
established in the same year; American scientists  have  been  in quasi-permanent 
occupation of the island ever  since. Except for the couple d years during which it 
was grounded on the Alaskan slope, T-3 has been slowly circling the Beaufort 
Sea in a clockwise trajectory between the North Pole and the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago. At the time of the Escamilla incident, T-3 was reported as measuring 
approximately 7 miles long and 4 miles wide. Except for isolation, life for the 
personnel on the island presents no great problem, since  supply can easily  be made 
by aircraft. The life of the island itself does not seem to be in danger either, 
although there is  always the possibility of its  being caught by the transpolar drift 
whenever it gets  close to the North Pole; it would then terminate its  existence  in 
the Greenland Sea, as did another ice  island (ARLIS 11) in 1965. 
The legal question which now arises is whether ice islands such as T-3 may 
be considered as  floating  pieces of territory, ships  or  something  else. To consider 
ice  islands  as  floating  pieces of territory would present an element of logic,  since 
they are but fragments of ice shelves which are legally assimilated to land. If 
that is  so,  all  ice  islands  in the Arctic might  have  to  be considered as  coming under 
Canadian sovereignty, since they all seem to have originated from Ellesmere 
Island. However, does not an ice shelf fragment become a res nullius once de- 
tached and subject to territorial acquisition by the first occupant? If so, does the 
new territorial sovereignty continue as long as the ice  island  is occupied, regard- 
less of the drift path which  it  follows? Pursuing this  kind of reasoning soon  reveals 
that it is  somewhat unrealistic to continue considering ice  shelf fragments as land 
after they have become  movable and have drifted away  from their place of origin 
onto the high  seas. A fortiori, the same observation applies to ordinary ice  floes, 
which are not of territorial origin. Ice islands do not have the qualities of perma- 
nency and stability  which are basic characteristics of any piece of territory. Even 
if an ice island could somehow  be anchored in the Arctic Ocean or grounded in a 
shallow sea, the consequences of considering  it  as territory of the occupying state 
would  be unacceptable in international law; such action would  be contrary to the 
Convention on the High Seas which provides that no state may validly purport 
to subject any part of the high  seas  to its sovereignty. 
But, if ice  islands cannot be  assimilated to land, can they perhaps be  considered 
as ships? These natural scientific platforms are indeed  used  very  much the same 
way as research ships to study the ocean floor, the current and the winds.  They 
could also conceivably be used as aircraft carriers and warships. Although no 
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means have yet been  devised to control the movements of those ice  islands,  they 
do constitute a  new  mode of navigation.  Consequently, the suggestion  is that, once 
ice shelves have fragmented themselves into i c e  islands and floated away onto 
the high seas, they have ceased to come under the sovereignty of the State of 
origin.  They  have  lost  their  immobile  and  quasi-land character and have  acquired 
a mobile ship-like nature. They constitute a special kind of res nullius, subject 
to appropriation by the first occupant. The result of this appropriation, however, 
is more in the nature of the acquisition of ownership of a chattel than of sover- 
eignty over a territory, even if the occupant is acting on behalf of a State. For 
these reasons, it is submitted that ice islands ought to be considered as ships 
rather than land. 
Bases for State Jurisdiction and the T-3 Incident 
It is  generally  agreed that there are four  possible  bases for the exercise of state 
jurisdiction: territory, nationality, protection of special state interests such as 
security, and protection of certain universal  interests permitting jurisdiction  over 
crimes  such as piracy. The first  two  bases are involved here and will be consid- 
ered briefly in relation to the T-3 incident. Jurisdiction based on sovereignty 
over territory gives a State exclusive  jurisdiction - subject to agreements to the 
contrary and  to diplomatic  immunities  recognized by international law - to all 
persons and things found on its territory. The exclusiveness of jurisdiction is 
such that a  State’s  forcible  removal of a person  from another State’s territory is 
a  violation of the  latter’s territorial sovereignty and involves the international re- 
sponsibility of the former. The question which arises here is whether Canada’s 
territorial sovereignty  may  be  considered as extending to the T-3 incident since it 
took place within the Canadian arctic sector. More specifically, is the Sector 
Theory invoked by Senator Pascal Poirier in 1907, in support of Canada’s  claim 
to arctic islands north of the mainland, to be relied  upon now to claim  sovereignty 
right up to the Pole. True, such an  assertion of sovereignty has sometimes  been 
made in the House of Commons, but there also  have  been statements to the con- 
trary. As recently as March 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau stated in reply to a 
question in the House  that,, in his  opinion, the Sector Theory did not apply to 
water and ice. It is  suggested that this  opinion  is quite consistent  with the physical 
realities of the Arctic Ocean as briefly  described  above. Of course, the Prime Min- 
ister was merely expressing his own personal opinion and there does not seem 
to be  any  definite  government  policy on the question. Mr. J. A.  Beesley,  head of 
the Legal Division of External Affairs,  was probably quite correct when he stated 
in front of the Standing Committee of the Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, in April 1970, that Canadian governments  have  neither 
affirmed nor disaffirmed the Sector Theory in unequivocal terms. He did add, 
however, that they did not intend to abandon the theory. This reservation is 
difficult to understand. The Sector Theory has never been recognized in inter- 
national law  as - a  valid  basis  for  the  acquisition of sovereignty  over territory and 
has  never  been  invoked - not even by the U.S.S.R. - as a m a s s  of acquiring 
sovereignty  over the pack  ice of the Arctic Ocean. This does not mean that the 
Sector  Theory  could not be  used  eventually as a  basis of agreement to delimit the 
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arctic regions for the purpose of pollution control by the coastal States or for 
some other specific purpose. It does mean, however, that  the theory in question - 
and it remains only a theory - cannot be invoked to claim territorial jurisdiction, 
the main reason being that it would be contrary to the well-established principle of 
the freedom of the high seas. 
Jurisdiction based on nationality extends to all nationals, regardless of whether 
they are inside or outside a State’s territory. In practice, however, States usually 
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over their nationals in respect of acts com- 
mitted on  the territory of another State and, in case of conflict, territorial juris- 
diction is generally recognized as taking precedence over personal jurisdiction. 
But, who has jurisdiction over  offences committed by nationals in  places not under 
the sovereignty of any State, such as on a ship on the high  seas? In such a case, 
jurisdiction over criminal offences  generally  belongs to the State of the flag. The 
rule that  the State of the flag has jurisdiction over everything  which takes place 
aboard ship is so well established that a coastal State cannot exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction on board a foreign ship passing through its territorial waters to arrest 
a person for a crime committed on board during passage,  unless the consequences 
of the crime extend to the coastal State. It is on the basis of the State of the flag 
rule that the United States exercised jurisdiction over the T-3 incident. More 
specifically,.it acted under its special maritime jurisdiction which is defined in 
the United States Code as  including the high  seas  and  any  vessel  belonging to the 
United States or any of its citizens,  when such vessel  is  within the admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any par- 
ticular State. The Code further provides that the more serious crimes, such as 
murder and manslaughter, shall constitute federal crimes and .that the trial of 
offences committed On the high seas -shall take place in the district where the 
accused is .arrested or first brought. In the present case, Escamilla was brought 
to Dulles airport and reportedly arrested there also; consequently the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia was the proper judicial authority 
effectively to exercise jurisdiction on  behalf of the United States. 
The above reasoning is based, of course, on the assumption that Ice Island T-3 
may properly be assimilated to a ship. However, even if this assimilation is 
rejected and, by the same token, the national character of the vessel, it is sub- 
mitted that the United States would still have had jurisdiction based on the 
nationality of the accused person and the national character of the research sta- 
tion. The principle of personal jurisdiction has been  extended to apply to places 
such as the Antarctic and outer space, and it does seem to be the only logical 
and practical solution to settle the question of jurisdiction over acts done in  places 
out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. 
CONCLUSION 
Having examined the possible  bases for state jurisdiction in international law, 
the conclusion  is that  the United States has properly exercised its personal juris- 
diction over the T-3 incident. It is submitted that the legal status of the Arctic 
Ocean is essentially the same as for any other ocean and that Ice Island T-3 may, 
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for  the present purposes at least,  be  assimilated to  a ship. Consequently, the inci- 
dent may  be  deemed to have taken place on an American ship on the high  seas. 
It might be added, however, that a further question may  arise under American 
domestic law,  as distinguished from international law,  whether the  term “vessel” 
in  the United States Code is capable of a sufficiently liberal construction as to 
include an ice  island. If it is not, the United  States should be  able to assume  its 
personal jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality of the ‘accused person and 
the national  character of the research station. 
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